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Of the main controversies in 20th century political economy, none were more 
heated than the debate over Marxism and, relatedly, the debate over 
capitalism. John Maynard Keynes was a major figure in both controversies. In 
this paper I will first touch on Keynes’s contribution to the debate with 
Marxism. I will then go on to take up the criticism of capitalism with which he 
is lastingly associated. Both these strains in Keynes’s thinking lead us 
ineluctably (to use a favorite word of his) to his work of great genius, his 
theory of economic activity. The latter topic will give me a chance to propose 
a non-monetary model of employment that, contrary to my previous non-
monetary models, preserves the main driver in Keynes’s theory and, at the 




The Radical Economist 
Much of Keynes’s work was a response or a reaction to capitalism. So a 
definition of capitalism may be in order. A predominantly capitalist economy, 
whatever its minor deviations from the ideal type, generally means a private-
ownership system marked by great openness to the new commercial ideas and 
the personal knowledge of private entrepreneurs and, further, by great 
pluralism in the private knowledge and idiosyncratic views among the wealth-
owners and financiers who select the ideas to which to provide capital and 
incentives for their development.1 Most economists today view capitalism as 
having evolved into a rousing system for cutting-edge innovation over the 19th 
century. This system stands in sharp contrast to the economic system for 
industrial peace, social consensus and community stability that began to 
spring up here and there on the European continent in the late 1920s and 
1930s – the corporatist economy. 
 
                                                          
*  McVickar Professor of Political Economy and Director, Center on Capitalism and Society, Earth Institute, 
Columbia University. This paper is about one-half of the paper given at the Santa Colomba conference – the 
macro half. (The political economy half is available under the title “Corporatism and Keynes.”) My 
discussion here of Keynes’s evolving thoughts about capitalism has benefited from interactions over the 
decades with several scholars, including Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Roman Frydman, Axel Leijonhufvud, Robert 
Mundell, Joseph Stiglitz  and, among those deceased, Harry Johnson and James Tobin. 
1  The term free enterprise might convey better this Hayekian conception of capitalism but I would rather not 
proliferate terminology. 
Keynes, born in 1883, was immersed in the milieu of capitalism through 
his student years and his twenties. British capitalism was no longer the pace 
setter and Britain was in low spirits from a loss of empire in those years but it 
was a far more innovative time than the interwar decades and the postwar 
decades were to be. It would have been nearly impossible for Keynes to see 
the society in which he lives as a determinate system, subject only to random 
fluctuations around a foreordained trend path. 
 
There is some evidence that Keynes read and was sympathetic to the 
indeterminists. A philosophy of free will and indeterminism was set out in the 
chief work of Henri Bergson, translated into English in 1911.2 “Was Keynes 
familiar with Bergson?” (So asks an historian of economics, Tom Walker, 
over the internet.) The answer is yes. Keynes’s biographer, Robert Skidelsky 
quotes a comment by Keynes on Bergson. “There is nothing in Bergson’s 
logic, but something quite interesting in his ideas, if only one could get at 
them clearly.”3 
 
Keynes came to a view on what causes the indeterminacy of a society’s 
evolution. The causes are discoveries (as Hayek would have put it), or 
innovations. Thus the source is mankind’s creativity. In the General Theory 
Keynes suggests this in one of his most dramatic lines. “What drives the world 
is ideas and nothing else.”4 [CHK] We are to understand here that new ideas 
are by their nature not completely determined, otherwise they would not be 
new. In this pithy assertion Keynes rejects the Marxist theory of history with 
its historical determinism. Of course, Keynes was by no means referring 
exclusively or primarily to new commercial ideas, from Watt’s steam engine 
and Birdseye’s frozen foods to Disney’s animated cartoons, Ingvar Kamprad’s 
Ikea and Nat Taylor’s creation of the cineplex. The famous line occurs in the 
context of theories about how the economy works and, in particular, how 
economic policy is created by the ideas of economic science. But Keynes’s 
expressed view of capitalist economies strongly indicates that he thought of 
them as driven by new entrepreneurial ideas or, at times, the dearth of them. 
 
With the hard times that the British economy fell into, starting with the 
general strike of 1926, Keynes shows no interest in the innovativeness of 
capitalism. It may very well be that Keynes by the 1930s no longer saw 
Britain’s economy as a bountiful source of innovation. It would be fair to read 
Keynes’s General Theory as having laid Britain’s depression from 1926 to the 
mid-1930s to a near-cessation of innovation, owing to some appreciable 
drying up of entrepreneurial visions. (Yet Keynes said toward the end of his 
life that his theory in the 1930s was not “forever” and that he wanted after the 
                                                          
2  Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. from the French (1907), New York: H. Holt, 1911. 
3  Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes, 1983-1946: Economist, Philosopher, Statesman, London: 
Macmillan, 19xx. Quoted in the Bibliography.. 
4  General Theory, p. xxx. 
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second world war was over to develop another theory.5 
 
It is far from clear that Keynes was an admirer of capitalist Britain’s 
innovativeness, even when it was innovative. As I comment in the companion 
paper to this one, Keynes appears to have had no sense of the important role 
of innovation in imparting excitement and personal development to business 
careers. In his dyspeptic 1932 essay he seems to view the economic future for 
Britain as a long slog of decreasing unpleasantness toward the point where 
industry has finally increased household utility as far as it can go – the “utility 
satiation” of Frank Ramsey.  
 
If the future was not highly determinate, no one could completely know 
the future. This uncertainty about the future was an undercurrent of Keynes’s 
view of the world beginning with his book on probability.6 And this 
uncertainty applied also to the future (and possibly present) consequences of 
present actions. 
 
Keynes could be credited with another theory of entrepreneurs’ 
uncertainty as well. This added theory, for which he became well-known, held 
that even if the economy were fundamentally deterministic, no one of any 
sophistication would feel sure of having the true model of that ultimately 
deterministic economy. For Keynes it was patently obvious that there are 
persistent “differences of opinion.” There often appear to be a difference of 
thinking between insiders and outsiders, entrepreneurs and financiers, bulls 
and bears. Just why this is so is a subject of some controversy. One 
explanation, it would appear, could start from the observation that there are 
myriad differences in private knowledge acquired from different experiences 
in a career, as Hayek emphasized, not just a common set of macro 
observations plus a random variations over time and place. Furthermore, 
because no one has the opportunity to study data from an economy that is free 
of differences in opinion, identifying the true model with any reliability must 
be highly problematic.7  
 
Nevertheless, Keynes did write as if there is normally a dominant model 
but beliefs in it (or at any rate parts of it) are “flimsy” – unraveling once 
doubts build up to some threshold level.8 
 
 
                                                          
5  Professor Juan Vicente Sola, University of Buenos Aires, told me in May 2007 he heard Hayek quote 
Keynes to that effect in a lecture Hayek gave in Chile in the 1980s. 
6  Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, London: Macmillan, 1921. In the same year Frank Knight introduced 
the same concept, under the name uncertainty, in his Risk, Uncertainty and Profit Boston: Houghton Miflin, 
1921. 
7  Roman Frydman argues that if an actor in the economy had the true model for a time, he or she would not 
know it and so quite possibly try another model in hopes of beating that one.  
8  This point may be the most important one made in his sequel paper, “The General Theory of 
Employment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1937. 
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The Theorist of Business Inactivity 
From the mid-’20s well into the ’30s the still predominantly capitalist 
economy of the U.K. remained in the doldrums. Keynes published his theory 
and his policy prescription in 1936 with his The General Theory.9 (As often 
happens to authors, Britain’s depression was essentially over by that time, 
although America’s was not.) 
 
Keynes’s basic theory is easy enough to state: Capitalism’s 
entrepreneurs and financiers backing (or declining to back) their projects face 
the uncertainty about the future introduced by Frank Knight, now usually 
known as Knightian uncertainty; and by Keynes himself in his Treatise on 
Probability. If as a result of worsening “visibility” or an increased aversion to 
bearing an unchanged uncertainty the entrepreneurs or the financiers pull in 
their horns, the consequences will include a fall of entrepreneurial project 
valuations, a fall in investment activity and a fall of real interest rates (though 
less than necessary to prop valuations and investing back up). An effect in 
turn of the reduced investment is a fall in aggregate employment. Robert 
Mundell and Marcus Fleming argued using their model that employment 
would not fall if the economy is open and if the money supply were held 
constant, at least initially. In that case a transient fall of interest rates would 
prompt a real exchange rate depreciation just large enough to cause the fall of 
investment to be offset by a rise of net exports (known also as net foreign 
investment). Let us focus in what follows on the case in which the interest rate 
is set by the central bank to hold constant the exchange rate. 
 
The policy for responding to such an eventuality that Keynes advocated 
was either a reduction of interest rates engineered by the central bank, which 
would mean unpegging the exchange rate, or, if the interest rate is to remain 
on a par with overseas rates so as to maintain the exchange rate, an increase in 
investment activity by the state – either through state enterprises or through 
increased purchases of public goods (or services) by the public sector. 
 
The prescription of stepping up state investing in spite of the increased 
uncertainty or the increased aversion to it could fairly be said to be another 
exercise in corporatist thinking. Only later, it appears, did it come to be 
recognized by Keynesians that tax cuts might serve the purpose as well or 
better than public investment. Keynes may have been thinking of the massive 
investment in the rail and highway system that Mussolini instituted to cope 
with the depressionary forces that came Italy’s way in the second half of the 
’20s and early ’30s. 
 
Keynes’s analysis was plagued by his omission of a reason why money 
wage rates would not come to the rescue or else why they couldnù’t help even 
if they caqme. In his defense it could be suggested that he may have had in the 
back of his mind an open economy with a fixed exchange rate. In the policy 
                                                          
9   Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, London, Macmillan, 1936. 
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framework specified above, the effect of money-wage reductions would just 
be equiproportionate decreases in the demand for money and thus in the 
money supply (to keep the interest rate continuously at the level required to 
maintain the exchange rate), so that there would be no expansionary benefit. 
But he could not avail himself of that argument in the book as written, which 
appears consistently to refer to a closed economy from the first chapter to the 
last. And in the closed economy case, he needed to resort to the argument that 
a downward spiral in money wage rates could destabilize investors and thus 
possibly do more harm than good. But at some point, continued declines in the 
average level of money wage rates would cease to inspire speculation that 
money wage rates would have still further to fall, since by some point they 
would already be at a terribly low level and thus as likely to rise, it would 
seem, rather than fall some more. 
 
I will take this opportunity to show that Keynes could have spared 
himself and his disciples the long brouhaha about money wage rates if, to 
simplify, he had instead couched his thesis of the arbitrariness of the level of 
employment in terms of a non-monetary model such as I sketched around 
1990 (in the closed economy version) and which was set out in both the closed 
and openeconomy versions in my 1994 book.10 Here I will add a new element, 
employment in the activity of developing and launching new entrepreneurial 
ideas. 
 
I want to picture a closed economy (as Keynes did) with a fixed labor 
force, L, in which, to take the easiest case, shirking, not quitting afflicts the 
employment relationship. Absent entrepreneurial activity, employment and 
thus unemployment, would be determined simply by the intersection of an 
upward sloping Wage Curve and a downward sloping demand curve. The 
downward slope comes from the higher rates of shirking at higher rates of 
employment. Yet I will also need some diminishing returns to labor in 
production to avoid running into difficulties or complications in what follows. 
So, for example, I want to posit that land as well as labor is required for 
production. 
 
We can think of these production firms as having potentially 
entrepreneurial teams, each headed by their entrepreneur-leader, but they are 
just so much labor unless they are deployed in the development and launch of 
some idea that their leader can obtain financing for. Decision by many 
financiers to back some proposed entrepreneurial projects is not neutral for the 
economy’s aggregate employment. At least the economy total demand for 
labor curve is affected, generally speaking. I will suppose that the activity of 
an entrepreneurial team does not require land and, for simplicity, that the 
entrepreneur does not face a shirking problem. 
                                                          
10  Phelps, Seven Schools of Macroeconomic Thought, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990, and 
Phelps, Structural Slumps: The Modern Equilibrium Theory of Unemployment, Interest and 
Assets, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1994. 
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At the diagrammatic level, the model reduces to two curves in the 
employment-average valuation plane, (N, q ), where N denotes the level of 
employment, given the labor force, L, and q denotes the mean valuation being 
placed on entrepreneurial investment projects. Inevitably, q will cause readers 
to think of the “shadow price” attaching to having one more entrepreneurial 
team (to engage in its entrepreneurial project), except that the true shadow 
price is not given to financiers nor entrepreneurs. In recent work I have 
posited an industrial fair in which entrepreneurs and financiers meet to 
determine the price on the marginal project under conditions of Knightian 
uncertainty; such a construction gives a q, given subjective “expectations” (if 
one may use that word in this context) or, as Keynes would have said, “animal 
spirits.” 
 
In this plane there is an upward sloping curve (dubbed the Phelps curve 
by a kind discussant of a 2001 paper) describing how the level of 
entrepreneurial teams created will be greater the higher is the valuation of a 
team. Rising employment requires a rising “supply price” because higher 
employment entails a larger number of entrepreneurial teams, thus a worse-
looking marginal project, so valuations must be generally higher to let in such 
a marginal project. (In all this, the ordinary production sector, whose price is 
one, sets the demand wage associated with any given level of employment.) 
 
The other curve describes how the valuation of the marginal project, 
which depends on future prospects and their uncertainty, etc., varies as 
employment is increased. We can specify this curve as downward-sloping, 
since the costs of running every entrepreneurial team will be higher the greater 
is the employment level. (It would make no difference if the curve were flat.) 
 
A deterioration in future prospects or an increase in their uncertainty or 
in the aversion to uncertainty operates to shift down the latter curve, thus 
lowering the market-clearing valuation of the marginal entrepreneurial project 
corresponding to each and every employment level. That shift results in a 
movement down the other curve, thus a decrease in both the quasi-equilibrium 
valuation and in the level of employment. 
 
The essential point is made. Shifts in the quasi-equilibrium employment 
level do not hinge on monetary considerations, such as money supply and 
money wage rates and money prices. Keynes’s message did not need to drag 
in those considerations, only to follow up his notion of the animal spirits of 
entrepreneurs and financiers. 
 
It follow that what we may call the “natural” rate of unemployment in a 
somewhat extended sense in keeping with the extension of the model to 
Knightian uncertainty is a function of that uncertainty and the aversion to it. 
We can re-interpret Keynes’s theory of the impact of animal spirits as a 
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proposition about the natural unemployment rate. 
 
This model departs considerably from Keynes with regard to policy, 
however. An increase of government expenditure – even expenditure on new 
capital goods for the public sector (once capital is admitted into the model) 
would do nothing to shift up the valuation curve and do nothing to shift down 
the “supply price” curve. Indeed, any tendency of the increased government 
investment activity to raise real interest rates would cause project valuations 
to fall and thus to reduce employment. And any tendency for the higher tax 
rate that might be introduced to finance the government expenditures would 
tend in the short run at least to shift to the left the supply-price curve and thus 
also to contract employment. 
 
It is reasonable to feel that Keynes was rash to base a case for a massive 
increase in governmental investment activity on a model that should have 
been viewed as just one of a great many models remaining to be formulated in 
a formal way and studied for their implications. It is reasonable also to suspect 
that it was Keynes’s fondness – as late as the mid-’30s – for corporatist 
intervention in the behavior and direction of the economy that predisposed 
him to draw the policy conclusions he did. 
 
In the end he apparently sensed that he had carelessly invited all manner 
of interventions into the economy. In his last words, appearing in the 
Economic Journal in 1946 he speaks of the line of thinking he embarked upon 
in the first half of the 1930s as “having gone silly and sour.” We can 
reasonably surmise that he intended to rethink his 1936 monetary model of 
employment with an eye to reappraising the value of “spending” as a means to 
prosperity. His early death at merely 64 deprived us of the mature ideas of one 
of the very greatest economists of his century. 
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APPENDIX 
Excerpts from Marco E. L; Guidi, “Corporative Economics and the Italian Tradition of 
Economic Thought,” Storia del Pensiero Economico, No. 40, 2000/I.. 
The nature and scope of corporative economics 
The reconstruction of the context in which corporative economics developed has revealed that 
different tendencies were present in the debate. Historians of economic thought have tried to 
clarify the characteristics of the main groups or “schools”. 
First comes the group of “integral” corporatists (Zagari 1982), who believed that the 
corporative doctrine was alternative to marginalist economics (Bini 1982). They thought that the 
newly introduced mechanisms of public negotiation between the government and the 
representatives of labourers and capitalists had determined the end of class conflict and of 
traditional market relationships. This fact in its turn implied the mutation of individual values and 
motives. Private individuals would spontaneously give up their self-interested behaviour and 
subordinate their actions to the higher universal goals of the State. This mental revolution, as 
Gino Arias stated, implied the rise of a new “corporative conscience”. 
For “integral” corporatists, economics should be characterised by a normative approach:  
[They] wanted to re-introduce ethics and the dialectic between the individual and the State into economics. Thus 
they intended to prepare the ground for a science of a normative, rather than cognitive, character. This science was 
to sanction the unambiguous political supremacy of the State over the economic order (Zagari 1982, p. 28). 
This was the common denominator of a wide range of different, often conflicting (Faucci 
1990b, p.16) approaches. 
The more radical was the “statalist” and “philosophical” tendency led by Ugo Spirito. Spirito 
propounded a Hegelian interpretation of corporativism. In his approach, individuals were totally 
subordinated to the State. Without the enlightened guide of government, society necessarily 
precipitated into chaos. Spirito also believed that economics was subordinated to politics and to 
the supreme and universal judgement of philosophy. In the course of time, he went increasingly 
pessimistic about the scientific content of economics, which he came to consider no more than a 
“technique” (Perri – Pesciarelli 1990). According to Spirito, the corporative organisation of the 
economy was a third way between capitalism and socialism. Corporativism was the only social 
organisation that triumphed over individual “particularism” and selfishness.  
Many eclectic thinkers followed Spirito in this approach. One of them was Giuseppe Bottai, 
who believed in “corporative democracy”. There are many similarities between his vision of the 
self-government of producers organised by the State, and Spirito’s ideal of “proprietary 
corporation” (Cavalieri 1994, pp. 17-18). Another group of “integral” corporatists emerged from 
the anti-individualistic wing of the nationalist movement. It was composed by Alfredo Rocco, 
Carlo Costamagna, Francesco Ercole and Filippo Carli. They believed in a strong supremacy of 
the State, although they rejected Spirito’s Hegelian arguments. Also Rodolfo Benini agreed with 
Spirito on the project of a reformed science based on the subordination of the individual to the 
State (Faucci 1990c, p. 214). 
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The second group of corporative economists shared with the first the “statalist” approach. 
However its members tried to restate the issues of corporativism in an economic language. Two 
leaders of this group were Nino Massimo Fovel and Celestino Arena. Fovel engaged himself in 
an attempt to conciliate corporative theory and pure economics, «through a confuse notion of the 
“economic character” (economicità) of human behaviour, which included anti-economic 
behaviour (minimum result, with maximum means)» (Faucci 1990b, p. 16). The role played by 
Arena was perhaps more interesting. Arena tried to bridge the gap between academic and 
corporative economics by discussing the problems related to «political prices, price 
discrimination and the taxation of “unproductive surplus”» (Faucci 1995b, p. 526). In his 
university lectures published in 1933-34, he found in the rigidity of the labour demand a cause of 
structural unemployment. In Arena’s approach, the flexibility of wages was not expedient in 
order to contrast this tendency. In an article written in 1937, he proudly compared himself to 
Keynes (Bini 1982, pp. 279-281). But the more important aspect of Arena’s work was the interest 
he showed in foreign new economic approaches. With American institutionalism  
he shared both the opposition to the excessive neo-classical bent towards abstraction, and the need to integrate 
economic theory with contributions coming from other disciplines, especially from law studies (Bini 1982, p. 263).  
His editorial work in the Nuova collezione di economisti should be interpreted in this light. 
This collection should not be considered as a failure of corporatist culture. It was perhaps an 
attempt to attract younger academic economists – eager to open new perspectives in their 
discipline – towards corporative economics. Arena was sympathetic to Amoroso and De’ Stefani 
and was responsible for the “conversion” to corporative economics of other economists like Lello 
Gangemi and Guido Menegazzi. 
A third tendency – led by the catholic economist Gino Arias – was characterised by a more 
“privatistic” approach. Arias belonged to the conservative wing of social Catholicism (Faucci 
1990b, p. 16). Significantly, Mussolini himself often hosted in “Critica Fascista” Arias’s writings 
on corporativism (Bini 1981). Arias’s vision was based on the idealisation of the Italian medieval 
society and on Scholastic philosophy. According to him, the adoption of the corporative model 
should be the result of a moral revolution taking place in the conscience of individuals. However, 
he thought that the institution of a corporative economy did not change traditional hierarchies and 
social distinctions of roles. Society was not an aggregation of individual interests, and the State 
was just one essential element in the social pyramid, but not the totalitarian Leviathan that 
radically subordinated everything (Zagari 1982, pp. 27 and 32). Arias was followed by Carlo 
Emilio Ferri – who was sympathetic to attempts to bridge the gap between corporativism and 
orthodox economics (Zagari 1990, p. 461) – and Francesco Vito. According to Faucci (1990b) 
Vito was an author midway between orthodox economics and the catholic version of corporative 
economics. 
How many traditions of political economy? 
A further question raised by the historiography on the economics of the inter-war period 
concerns the place of corporative economics in the long-term evolution of the Italian economic 
thought. 
According to Riccardo Faucci (1990b, pp. 5-6) the Italian economics of the inter-war period 
issued from two distinct and conflicting traditions originated in the 19th century. The first 
tradition was distinguished by an individualist, theoretical and ultraliberal approach. Francesco 
Ferrara (1810-1900) (see Faucci 1995a) was its main representative, while Galiani and Beccaria 
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were its forerunners. This tradition favoured the introduction of marginalism in Italy between 
1990 and 1914, the period in which, according to Schumpeter (1954, p. 855), Italian economics 
was “second to none”. 
The second – and prevailing – tradition was characterised by an organicist, historicist and 
moderately interventionist approach. This tradition could be traced back to Genovesi and later to 
Romagnosi and Gioia, despite differences between them20. After 1848, and especially after the 
unification of Italy in 1861, this tradition generated a variety of schools of thought. Among them, 
the majority was held by the Chair Socialists (Luzzatti, Lampertico, Messedaglia) – who favoured 
substantive State intervention in tariff regulations, social policy, technical education, and 
banking. Also some moderate liberals such as Minghetti and Sella, and Catholic economists like 
Giuseppe Toniolo shared the same approach to economics (see Guidi 1996). These authors had in 
common a paternalist, anti-universalistic and inegalitarian vision of society, coupled with a 
distrust in the automatic functioning of the economy. The society was governed by the 
responsible agency of the ruling classes, both in private relationships and in the public sphere. 
State intervention should be subsidiary to the private benevolent initiative of paternalist agents. 
Economics was not a highly theoretical and independent science, but a practical and empirical 
discipline, strictly connected with other ethical, legal and political sciences21. 
According to Faucci, this paternalist and historicist tradition  
was re-launched by fascist corporativism. But it was an ephemeral success. After the war, no room was left for 
both autochthonous currents, and the Italian economic thought lost any national connotation (Faucci 1990b, p. 6).  
This conclusion contains many elements of truth. For example, a system of corporative 
representation had been espoused by Toniolo on the model of the Italian middle age guilds. 
Toniolo also argued that corporativism represented a “third way” between liberalism and 
socialism. Its moral and political superiority lay in the fact that it encouraged the “solidarity” 
between labour and capital. More widely the ideas of solidarity and harmony between classes had 
been central to the debate on “association” and “co-operation” in the second half of the 19th 
century (see Piretti 1985) – a debate which was strictly connected to the movements in favour of 
economic associations, co-operatives and municipal services.  
However, studies on the evolution of economic associations and the co-operative movement 
between the end of WW I and the rise of the fascist regime in 1922 have revealed that these 
organisations underwent a serious crisis during the so called “Biennio Rosso” (1919-20). Some 
leaders asked for the official recognition of these associations as a direct response to the crisis. 
Also the leaders of the CGdL – the major workers union – solicited the legal erga omnes 
enforcement of the contracts negotiated by their representatives (see Pepe 1996). The fascist 
regime acquiesced to these demands by promulgating the corporative law and bestowing a public 
status to some economic institutions and unions. At the same time these institutions were 
submitted to a strict and illiberal political control. However, the most enduring result of this 
policy was that syndicates, economic associations and trade unions were transformed into official 
organisms, endowed with monopolistic privileges and administrative functions. Significantly, the 
return to political freedom after WW II did not entail their re-privatisation. 
There are reasons to believe that such a metamorphosis in the legal status of economic 
organisations was to fascist totalitarian ideology as the private and solidaristic nature of pre-
WW I associations was to the 19th-century moderate-liberal vision of society. If so, then this 
break in the history of social facts corresponded to a discontinuity in social and economic ideas. 
Despite some superficial analogies, there was a radical rupture between the “privatistic” ideal of 
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solidarity endorsed by the liberal tradition, and the “publicistic” State-centred ideology of fascist 
corporativism. The authoritarian bent of fascist corporativism was not a pure addition to the 
established paternalist ideology, since it implied an inversion in the traditional conception of the 
relationships between society and politics. 
However, the new approach to economic regulation was not entirely new22. The connection 
between political and economic thought is crucial here. Zagari (1982, pp. 16-24), has stressed the 
role played by “revolutionary trade-unionism” – the current of the Italian socialist movement 
inspired to Georges Sorel and guided in the 1900s-1920s by Enrico Leone, Arturo Labriola and 
Adriano Olivetti. Still Zagari has emphasised the influence of nationalist ideology in the period 
between 1900 and 1923.  
At an early stage, “revolutionary trade-unionists” opposed the reformist revision of Marxism 
and exalted the role of class struggle and violence as weapons against the capitalist State. They 
refused to acknowledge the role of liberal political institutions, and opposed to them the “self-
government of producers”. According to many, this illiberal and authoritarian ideology later 
«furnished the ideological justification» to the fascist regimentation of the labour power (Zagari 
1982, p. 23; see also Gervasoni 2001; Cubeddu – Monceri 2001). Significantly, some leaders of 
revolutionary trade-unionism – like Lanzillo, Panunzio and Orano – soon adhered to fascist 
corporativism. 
As to nationalism, it «furnished a political platform» to fascist corporativism, in that it 
promoted «a sort of State trade-unionism which aimed to engage all productive classes in the 
pursuit of the greatest national prestige» (Zagari 1982, p. 23). More recent studies (Cardini 1990; 
Bianchini–Morato 1997; Michelini 1999) have confirmed this interpretation, by showing how 
some partisans of economic nationalism later became the active ideologists of corporativism. 
Lastly, the justification of corporativism given by Ugo Spirito allows us to evaluate the role 
of the Italian Hegelian tradition of political thought. This tradition had been originated by 
Bertrando Spaventa at the University of Naples. Spaventa drew from Hegel’s philosophy of law a 
conception whereby the State was the synthesis of the particularistic interests existing in any 
society. Among Spaventa’s followers were the Marxist philosopher Antonio Labriola and his 
younger friend and disciple, Benedetto Croce. The latter endorsed Spaventa’s liberal opinions. 
But the Italian Hegelian school of thought also generated the totalitarian approach known as 
“actual idealism” or “actualism”. This interpretation was exposed by Giovanni Gentile and Ugo 
Spirito, and had its centre in the Faculty of Law and School of Corporative Studies of Pisa 
University. According to the liberal version of Hegelianism, the conciliatory role of the State did 
not suppress the free and independent interplay of private interests and goals in civil society. 
Conversely, in Gentile’s and Spirito’s approach the mediation of the State entailed the absolute 
subordination of private inclinations to the regenerating ends of the State23. 
Spirito’s interpretation of corporativism and of the fascist political order was not entirely 
approved by other corporative economists. However, Spirito expressed in a philosophical 
language an idea that was common even to the heirs of the paternalist Catholic tradition, and to 
the proselytes of social Darwinist, voluntarist and élitist doctrines: this idea was that there was no 
spontaneous social order outside the regimentation of private interests within the State. The 
corporatist State-centred doctrine, therefore, was the result of the marriage between totalitarian 
Hegelianism and thoritarian pre-fascist ideologies, rather than the natural evolution of liberal 
moderate social and economic doctrines. 
